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ABSTRACT
Draft regulatory guidance suggests that if the processing of a child’s personal data begins
with the consent of a parent, then there is a need to ﬁnd and defend an enduring consent
through the child’s growing capacity and on to their maturity. We consider the implica-
tions for health research of the UK Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce’s (ICO) sugges-
tion that the relevant test for maturity is the Gillick test, originally developed in the context
of medical treatment. Noting the signiﬁcance of the welfare principle to this test, we exam-
ine the implications for the responsibilities of a parent to act as proxy for their child. We
argue, contrary to draft ICO guidance, that a data controller might legitimately continue
to rely upon parental consent as a legal basis for processing after a child is old enough to
provide her own consent. Nevertheless, we conclude that data controllers should develop
strategies to seek fresh consent from children as soon as practicable after the data control-
ler has reason to believe they are mature enough to consent independently. Techniques
for effective communication, recommended to address challenges associated with Big
Data analytics, might have a role here in addressing the dynamic relationship between
data subject and processing. Ultimately, we suggest that fair and lawful processing of a
child’s data will be dependent upon data controllers taking seriously the truism that con-
sent is ongoing, rather than a one-time event: the core associated responsibility is to con-
tinue to communicate with a data subject regarding the processing of personal data.
VC The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creati-
vecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original work is properly cited.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Does consent obtained from a parent for use of a child’s personal data for health
research ‘lapse’ when the child is old enough to provide her own consent? If so, when
does that lapse occur, how is it to be determined, and with what consequences?
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the increasing use of personal data from adults and
children alike for health research, hitherto these questions have not been addressed in
the literature or as a matter of data protection law.
In this article, we explore the implications of adopting ‘Gillick competence’—drawn
from healthcare law—as the relevant test of sufﬁcient maturity in the data protection
law context.1 We adopt the familiar medico-legal language of the ‘mature minor’. This
is intended to capture the moment when a child demonstrates sufﬁcient autonomy—
in a given context—to make a consent decision on her own behalf. Our discussion
takes a UK data protection perspective, both in the current context (under the Data
Protection Act 1998 or ‘DPA 1998’, which transposes the 1995 EU Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC) and also the future position (under the EU General Data
Protection Regulation 2016/679 or ‘GDPR’, enforceable from May 25 2018, and na-
tional legislation put forward through the Data Protection Bill 2017). We focus our
thoughts on the implications for health research of recognising a mature minor to be
able to exercise the rights of a data subject on her own behalf. Particularly, we centre
our analysis on the implications for the kind of longitudinal research that begins with a
parental consent and continues for many years. While we choose this as our focal point,
we note that the regulator’s suggestion that the Gillick test has something to offer data
protection law is not limited to [the context of] healthcare, research, or health research.
The points we make may, therefore, have broader application. At the end of the article,
we reﬂect upon additional suggestions by the regulator that one should consider alter-
natives to consent, where they are available under data protection law.
The article adopts the following structure: ﬁrst, we consider the rights of mature
minors in the healthcare context. Here we consider the Gillick test developed in
relation to children below the age of 16 and the operation of the Family Law Reform
Act (FLRA) 1969. We explore the complexities of the tests as they change with the
growing autonomy of a child, the contexts in which autonomy will or will not be
recognised, and we lay the groundwork for exploring the implications of this for rec-
ognising children to be able to exercise the rights of data subjects in their own right.
Next, we consider the age of legal capacity in the context of data protection and the
implications of mapping the Gillick test across from the healthcare context. This raises
crucial questions. For example, if Gillick is applied in data protection, then how can
1 Gillick competence is the test used by health professionals to determine whether a child under 16 years of
age is able to consent to his or her own medical treatment, without the need for parental permission or
knowledge. There is no lower age limit for Gillick competence to be applied. See Gillick v West Norfolk and
Wisbech Health Authority [1986] AC 112, discussed below.
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the child’s emerging competence be accommodated and how are the parents’ continu-
ing responsibilities as the child’s proxy to be exercised? From the point an individual
is judged ﬁrst able to exercise any right of a data subject, can she exclusively exercise all
the rights of a data subject or does her ability to exercise rights gradually unfold along-
side a parallel (albeit diminishing) duty of a parent? What is the signiﬁcance of the
fact that, in both healthcare and data protection domains, existing guidance states that
the core legal principle to be respected is the best interest of the child? How do
on-going best interest considerations intersect in this context with an assessment of
(decision-speciﬁc) maturity pre- or post-age 16? What are the responsibilities of a par-
ent in such a shifting scenario? Finally, we consider how the answers to these ques-
tions relate to the UK Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce’s (ICO) recommendations
regarding best practice in the context of Big Data analytics, an area of increasing appli-
cation and importance in data protection law. Will consent even continue to be
relevant from a data protection perspective for the processing of children’s data, when
data are to be used to support health research? We conclude by considering the
prospect of a move away from consent as the relevant legal basis for data processing.
These are signiﬁcant issues to explore, not least because draft guidance on the
forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) issued by the ICO in
March 2017 states: ‘Parental consent will always expire when the child reaches the age
at which they can consent for themselves. You [as data controller] need therefore to
review and refresh children’s consent at appropriate milestones.’2 This guidance
presupposes clear answers to the fundamental questions introduced above. Moreover,
irrespective of the issue of when maturity is achieved, it remains unclear whether the
ICO’s intention is to suggest that the validity of any consent provided by a parent
lapses as soon as a data subject is able to exercise rights on her own behalf. If so, this
would seem to be inconsistent with other guidance offered by data protection authori-
ties as well as the operation of the Gillick test itself in the healthcare context, which
recognises autonomy in ways that are themselves highly context-speciﬁc. We argue that
a straightforward legal transplant of the Gillick test is problematic and presents consid-
erable practical and ethical difﬁculties. This article, then, seeks to provide clarity for
academics, data controllers, and regulators alike.
While it is possible for there to be different kinds of legal representative, in this arti-
cle we focus on the possibilities surrounding parental consent. Our overarching aim is
to demonstrate the critical importance of establishing clearly both when an individual
is entitled to exercise the substantive rights of a data subject for herself, and how that
entitlement procedurally meshes with the parental exercise of a data subject’s rights
on her behalf. Clarity is a pre-requisite for an understanding of the legal and ethical
responsibilities of a data controller processing personal data for health research
purposes. It is also a pre-requisite for explanation to a data subject, and her parents, of
her right to speak for herself.
2 Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, ‘Consultation: GDPR Consent Guidance’, 26 <https://ico.org.uk/me
dia/about-the-ico/consultations/2013551/draft-gdpr-consent-guidance-for-consultation-201703.pdf> accessed
10 October 2017.
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I I . THE RIGHTS OF MATURE MINORS
In the UK, the age of full majority is 18.3 However, an individual is entitled to exercise
certain legal rights while still a minor. An example is provided in the context of health-
care and treatment. Section 8(1) of the FLRA 1969 provides that in England and Wales,
[t]he consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any
surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would
constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were
of full age; and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective
consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it
from his parent or guardian.
Further, the courts have established that a valid consent may be given to healthcare by
a child below the age of 16 if they are competent to make the occurrent decision.
Competence here is assessed according to what is known as the test for Gillick compe-
tence (and what are called the Fraser Guidelines). We proceed to elaborate on Gillick
competence and its relationship with the FLRA below.
A. The Gillick Test in Healthcare
The case of Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority4 established that
where a person under the age of 16 has reached sufﬁcient maturity to understand the
nature and consequences of a proposed intervention, and it is in their best interests to
do so, then they can provide a valid legal consent on their own behalf. This is a func-
tional, rather than status-based, test of competence. In other words, a ﬁnding of com-
petence is decision speciﬁc; competence is assessed at every decision point as it
relates to the healthcare intervention in question. Gillick was concerned with contra-
ceptive advice, and, in this context, Lord Fraser concluded that while a doctor should
always seek to persuade a child to tell a parent if she is seeking contraceptive advice,
. . . there may well be cases, and I think there will be some cases, where the girl
refuses either to tell the parents herself or to permit the doctor to do so and in
such cases, the doctor will, in my opinion, be justiﬁed in proceeding without the
parents’ consent or even knowledge provided he is satisﬁed on the following
matters: (1) that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his
advice; (2) that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to
inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very
likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without contra-
ceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment
her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer; (5) that her best
interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both without
the parental consent.5
3 Family Law Reform Act 1969 (England and Wales); Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991; Age of
Majority Act (Northern Ireland) 1969.
4 [1985] UKHL 7, [1986] AC 112.
5 ibid 173.
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If a child is not Gillick competent and is deemed to lack the capacity to consent to a
healthcare intervention, then any valid and lawful consent must be given on her behalf
by someone with parental (or other legal) responsibility or by the court. Here, it is
worth noting that beyond the child’s capacity to understand, in Gillick the court was
keen to ensure continued parental involvement so far as was consistent with the child’s
best interests. In all cases, the proxy decision maker has a duty to keep the child’s best
interests at the heart of any decision, and the child should be involved in the decision-
making process as far as possible (eg by providing her assent).6 Although developed in
the context of access to contraceptive services, Gillick has been extended to all aspects of
medical treatment and care. In Scotland, its spirit is embodied in statute.7 This is so in
two respects: ﬁrst, the Scottish provisions are restricted to recognising a right to consent
only to medical and dental treatment (and does not extend to other interventions such
as health research), and secondly, the putative ‘right’ is only to consent, not to refuse.
This reﬂects developments subsequent to Gillick, and to which we now turn.
The English and Welsh courts have established, through cases such as Re R8 and
Re W,9 that it is possible for an individual refusal of treatment to be overridden where
the court considers that to be in the child’s best interests. Thus, parental and court
consent in the minor’s best interests continues to be valid even where a child is compe-
tent to make a particular decision but purports to offer a refusal.10 The distinction
between consent and the ‘right to refuse’ medical care and treatment has been the
subject of extended academic discussion.11 The signiﬁcance of the distinction for our
discussion is 3-fold: ﬁrst, for a child under 16, any ﬁnding of competence will only re-
late to a decision. This is a narrow decision-speciﬁc competence, as established above;
thus, if Gillick competence is to be extended to the data protection context, the
implications of this need to be considered. Secondly, and relatedly, the pre-16 child’s
competence to make a consent decision under the Gillick test exists in parallel with
duties of others to act as proxy for them (with his or her best interests as an overriding
consideration). This is very different from any suggestion that a child, essentially, at-
tains majority (ie an absolute right to choose for herself) prior to the age of 18.12
6 Care Quality Commission, ‘Gillick Competency and Fraser Guidelines’ <http://www.cqc.org.uk/content/
nigels-surgery-8-gillick-competency-and-fraser-guidelines> accessed 10 October 2017. Where a court deter-
mines any question relating to a child, then s 1(1) Children Act 1989 puts the child’s welfare as the para-
mount consideration.
7 See s 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991. See further, S Elliston, Best Interests of the
Child in Healthcare (Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
8 Re R (a Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11.
9 Re W (a Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 64.
10 This is also the case post-16 (pre-18), in case of treatment decisions, due to the operation of s 8(3) Family
Law Reform Act 1969.
11 See eg E Cave, ‘Adolescent Consent and Conﬁdentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16 EJHL 309. Whether the
asymmetry of consent and refusal available to a mature minor must be understood to be due to an underly-
ing asymmetry of competence or instead can be explained by a notion of transitional paternalism is interest-
ingly explored by Neil Manson in ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to
the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ (2014) 29 Bioethics 66. See also N Manson, ‘When is a
Choice Not a Choice? ‘Sham Offers’ and the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ (2017) 31
Bioethics 296.
12 V Chico and L Hagger, ‘The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Mature Minors: A Missed Opportunity?’
(2011) 33(2) J Soc Wel Fam L 157.
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Thirdly, given that Gillick only applies to children below age 16, we must also ask
about the situation from age 16–18 and it is here that we return to the FLRA 1969.
It will be recalled that Section 8(1) of the 1969 Act, above, provides that a child be-
tween age 16 and 18 can consent to her own surgical, medical, or dental treatment.
Moreover, Section 8(3) of the Act provides: ‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as making ineffective any consent which would have been effective if this sec-
tion had not been enacted.’ What, then, is the relationship between the common law
(Gillick) minor and the statutory minor in terms of rights, responsibilities, and duties?
An initial observation is obvious: while the competence of a pre-16-year-old must always
be demonstrated and is only valid for each decision in which it is assessed, the threshold
of 16 brings with it a presumption of competence with respect to the treatments speci-
ﬁed in the statute. It follows, however, that this is not a general legal competence for
other spheres of life, including health research: age 16–18 remains a liminal space. Less
obvious, for want of any speciﬁc mention in Section 8 of the 1969 Act, are the tricky
questions of (i) the role of best interests, and (ii) the position with respect to refusals.
These have, however, been dealt with by the courts, notably by Lord Donaldson in Re
W above. In contemplating the mischief that the 1969 Act was designed to address,
Lord Donaldson revisited the report of the Latey Committee whose recommendations
formed the basis of the Act.13 Despite the fact that all professional bodies14 giving evi-
dence recommended that a consent between age 16 and 18 should also include a re-
fusal, the Committee—and subsequently the Act—only made mention of consent,
thereby rejecting such evidence. As Lord Donaldson himself remarked: ‘I am quite un-
able to accept that Parliament in adopting somewhat more prolix language was intend-
ing to achieve a result which differed from that recommended by the committee.’15 He
then added: ‘[w]hat I am clear about is that Parliament has not conferred such auton-
omy on a 16- to 18-year-old child by virtue of section 8 of the Act of 1969, and that the
common law, as interpreted by the House of Lords in Gillick’s case does not do so ei-
ther.’16 This was subsequently conﬁrmed in Re E, in which the refusal of a blood transfu-
sion by a child of age 15 and three-quarters was overridden on the basis of his best
interests.17 More signiﬁcantly, it was not until he reached age 18 that his refusal was re-
spected and he died as a result. This therefore also conﬁrms that best interest para-
mountcy endures in the period between age 16 and 18, despite no mention in the 1969
Act.
The principle that underpins both the common law and the statutory regime was
probably best captured by Lord Denning MR, shortly after the passing the 1969 Act:
The common law can, and should, keep pace with the times. It should declare,
in conformity with the recent Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority
. . . that the legal right of a parent to the custody of a child ends at the 18th birth-
day: and even up till then, it is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to
13 The Latey Committee, Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (1967) (Cmnd 3342), especially
paras 474–84.
14 With the exception of the Medical Protection Society.
15 Re W (n 9) 78.
16 ibid 87.
17 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386; [1994] 5 Med LR 73.
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enforce against the wishes of the child, and the more so the older he is. It starts
with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.18
Before proceeding, we would add a few caveats. It should not be thought that all re-
fusals are made equal; that is, the leading cases in this ﬁeld all involved life-threatening
situations and there are many other situations in which mature minors seek control
over their lives that pose no threats to their lives. To override such decisions in the
name of best interests becomes an increasingly untenable response over time. When
we therefore contemplate decisions about control of one’s own data in a
non-treatment context, we must be cautious about how far this line of precedent
assists us. We return to the signiﬁcance of the threshold of 16–18 in Section III, after
turning to the speciﬁc content of data protection itself.
B. Who is Entitled to Exercise the Data Subject Rights of a Mature Minor?
In the realm of data protection, regulatory guidance from both the regulator (ICO)
and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party states that it is possible for a
sufﬁciently mature minor to be able to exercise, and not just hold inchoately, the
rights of a data subject. For example, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party19
offers guidance on the issue in their Opinion on the protection of children’s personal
data.20 Consider the following quote:
If the processing of a child’s data began with the consent of their legal represen-
tative, the child concerned may, on attaining majority, revoke the consent. But if
he wishes the processing to continue, it seems that the data subject need give
explicit consent wherever this is required.
For example, if a legal representative has given explicit consent to the inclusion
of his child (the data subject) in a clinical trial, then upon attaining capacity, the
controller must make sure he still has a valid basis to process the personal data
of the data subject. He must in particular consider obtaining the explicit consent
of the data subject himself in order for the trial to continue, because sensitive
data are involved.21
These paragraphs encompass two distinct concepts. The idea of ‘attaining majority’ is
a reference to a bright line, such as the age of 18, while ‘attaining capacity’ might refer
to a factual state of affairs when a child is able to understand and consent for herself,
irrespective of her age and when the law must recognise her autonomy in respect of
the particular decision in question. Indeed, this latter possibility is entirely envisioned
by the Article 29 Working Party:
18 Hewer v Bryant [1970] 1 QB 357, 369.
19 The Article 29 Working Party is composed of representatives of the national data protection authorities in
the European Union, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission, and pro-
vides expert advice to the EUMember States regarding data protection.
20 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2009 on the protection of children’s personal data
(General Guidelines and the special case of schools) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2009/wp160_en.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017.
21 ibid 5.
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Since the child is a person who is still developing, the exercise of their rights –
including those relating to data protection – must adapt to their level of physical
and psychological development. Not only are children in the process of develop-
ing, but they have a right to this development.22
Regulatory guidance on data protection law in the UK also suggests that it is possible for
a sufﬁciently mature minor to exercise the rights of a data subject.23 The ICO’s draft guid-
ance on the GDPR states that when considering if a data subject can consent for herself,
the general rule (outside offering of information society services, discussed below) is:
. . . you [as data controller] should consider whether the individual child has the
competence to understand and consent for themselves (the ‘Gillick competence
test’). In practice, you may still need to consider age-veriﬁcation measures as
part of this assessment, and take steps to verify parental consent for children
without competence to consent for themselves.24
However, as noted above, the ‘Gillick competence test’ was developed in the context
of healthcare and treatment.25 In that context the law recognises an individual’s capac-
ity to make an occurrent decision on consent below the age of full majority at 18 years
old: competence is functionally assessed in relation to a speciﬁc decision and is neither
an abstract nor a generic assessment. What is more, a child’s competence to make a
decision does not proscribe the possibility of a parallel, and potentially overriding,
parental consent, when the child purports to refuse.
The ICO’s draft guidance thus raises a matrix of interesting questions related to
when, and to what extent, a child can speak for herself, and the changing nature of the
legal ability and duty of a parent to speak for her. In what follows, we tease out and
address these questions.
C. When Can a Child Speak for Herself in the Data Protection Context?
The rights of a data subject exist (at least) from birth.26 The relevant question here is:
when are data subjects able to exercise those rights, who is able to exercise those rights
along the trajectory of the data subject’s life, how should people other than the data
subject do that, and what are the on-going implications of them doing so? More
particularly, we must ask: from the point an individual is judged ﬁrst able to exercise
the rights of a data subject, can she exclusively exercise all the rights of a data subject
22 ibid 6.
23 In the UK, there is statutory acknowledgement that the concept of the mature minor extends to at least
some data decisions. For example, with regards to subject access requests, it has been stated that: ‘[i]n
Scotland, the law presumes that a child aged 12 years or more has the capacity to make a subject access re-
quest.’ Here the test is status-based rather than functional.
24 ICO, GDPR Consent Guidance (n 2) 27.
25 Gillick (n 1).
26 We question, for example, the privacy and data protection implication of new technologies such as non-
invasive prenatal foetal testing, which might generate whole genome sequencing data of the ‘future person’.
See Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, Non-invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues (2017), paras 3.32, 5.13, and
5.37, <http://nufﬁeldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/NIPT-ethical-issues-full-report.pdf> accessed 10
October 2017.
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(and must she be able to exercise all the rights to be able to exercise part), or does her
ability to exercise rights gradually unfold alongside a diminishing but parallel duty of a
legal representative to exercise those rights as a proxy?
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party suggests that:
Where consent is concerned, the solution [of determining the exercising of data
subject rights] can progress from mere consultation of the child, to a parallel
consent of the child and the legal representative, and even to the sole consent of
the child if he or she is already mature.27
Unfortunately, this is ambiguous guidance. It suggests that a mature minor can pro-
vide a sole consent and that, before it is possible for consent to be given solely by a
child, the child and the parent may consent in parallel. Yet a child could not give a
valid parallel consent unless she was deemed sufﬁciently mature to do so, and how is
the state of maturity required for a parallel consent to be contrasted with the circum-
stance when she is sufﬁciently mature to provide a ‘sole consent’? Is reference to ‘the
sole consent of the child’ intended to imply that, when a child can provide a sole con-
sent, then a parent may no longer consent on her behalf? While perhaps consistent
with the notion of emerging autonomy, this last suggestion is not consistent with
parents continuing to have parental responsibilities in relation to a child’s welfare.
Welfare considerations remain paramount here as in the healthcare context: guidance
from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has stated that, within a data
protection context, ‘The core legal principle is that of the best interest of the child.’28
As in the context of healthcare, parents continue to have responsibility—where
necessary, expressed through parental consent—to act in a child’s best interest.29
Recalling the interplay between pre-16 common law (Gillick) and the statutory
16–18 regime outlined above—which ﬁxes age 16 as the point at which a presump-
tion of competence emerges—we argue that it would be ethically preferable and
legally defensible for data controllers to envision (or, depending on their degree of
involvement, ascertain) the emerging ability of an individual to exercise ﬁrst the rights
of a data subject jointly (rather than in parallel) with a parent—as it will be through
dialogue that the child’s best interests are ascertained—and then a subsequent point
in time at which a child is sufﬁciently mature to exercise her data subject rights
independently (rather than solely) for particular isolated decisions, and then increas-
ingly areas of decision-making on the way to sole decision-making.30 The age of 16
would represent a prima facie threshold for independent decision-making, while
27 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 20) 6.
28 ibid 4.
29 We acknowledge the complexities and difﬁculties of applying the best interests test to children as noted, in-
ter alia, in the General Comment of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Child’s Best Interest
(General Comment No 14 (29 May 2013)), especially relating to the risk of manipulation in assessment
and implementation. For discussion, see E Cave, ‘Competence and Authority: Adolescent Treatment
Refusals for Physical and Mental Health Conditions’ (2013) 8(2) Contemp Soc Sci 92.
30 This is consistent with the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics’ recommendations in relation to children and clin-
ical research that ‘children from a young age should be understood not as “subjects” of research but as “ac-
tive participants”’. See Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, Children and Clinical Research: Ethical Issues (2015)
para 1.22 <http://nufﬁeldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Children-and-clinical-research-full-report.
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Gillick competence below age 16 might also demonstrate independence in a given
context. At no point, however, does the residual role for best interests fall away.
However, the ICO draft guidance above would suggest that—if the child is Gillick
competent—then the parents are no longer entitled under the law to exercise the
rights of the data subject on her behalf. This can only sensibly follow application of
the Gillick test if ability to consent also implies an ability to refuse, but that is not what
is implied by a simple import of the Gillick test from the healthcare context.
If competence to refuse is limited in healthcare to those cases where refusal is
recognised to be in the best interests of the child, then we might expect similar limita-
tions on the exercise of autonomy in the context of data protection. Put otherwise,
at the point of relevant maturity, a child can exercise all the rights of a data subject
conditional on that being consistent with her best interests. Thus, if a refusal to permit
processing is not consistent with her best interests, then her ability to refuse is limited
and parental responsibility to provide consent to data processing on her behalf
persists. The alternative is to deny the continuing availability of a parental consent to
processing in the child’s best interests. This said, and as indicated above, it is worth
recognising that a refusal to permit personal data processing may be expected to
interfere with her best interests less regularly than refusal to receive life-saving medical
treatment. The overriding point here is that parents may continue to provide a valid
consent even where a child satisﬁes the test of Gillick competence in relation to a
particular decision.
This informs how we argue the Article 29 Working Party guidance is best inter-
preted. The question of who is entitled to exercise the data subject rights of a mature
minor is best answered thus: parents are entitled, and required, to exercise the rights
as proxy in consultation with the child or when engaging the child jointly in a decision-
making process. The child is independently entitled when demonstrating sufﬁcient
maturity in the decision-making process to others charged with protecting her best
interests, and conditional only upon her decision being in her best interests. The
ability of a child to provide an independent consent does not proscribe her parents
exercising a parallel right to provide a consent on her behalf where this is consistent
with her best interests until the age of 18.
The guidance itself does not address the resolution of any potential conﬂict sce-
nario, for example: if a parent consents to processing and a child purports to refuse.
Our reading and interpretation of the guidance suggests resolution of such conﬂicts
consistent with the operation of the Gillick test in healthcare law. The Gillick test has
been preferred by the ICO, and the priority of best interests has been recognised by
the Article 29 Working Party. However, neither the Article 29 Working Party nor the
ICO draft guidance acknowledges explicitly the decision-speciﬁc nature of a compe-
tence assessment. If Gillick operates in the context of data protection, as it does in the
context of healthcare, then we would expect any assessment of competence to be valid
only relative to a particular exercise of data subject rights. This is an important qualiﬁ-
cation and supports the view, as we will express later, that in the absence of a speciﬁc
reason to think otherwise, then there must be a presumption that parental consent
pdf> accessed 10 October 2017. See also distinctions made within the broad concept of childhood and the
responsibilities that may attach to each, in ch 4.
10 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwx052/4621374
by University of Edinburgh user
on 15 November 2017
remains valid until age 16, and as a minimum the assessment and implementation of
best interests ought to occur jointly between the child and her parents throughout
childhood.
As noted above, the Article 29 Working Party has recognised that ‘not only are
children in the process of developing, but they have a right to this development’.31
Guidance on the validity of consent must be read in a way that recognises parents to
have responsibilities to do more than simply act as proxy for their child. There is a
duty to support the emerging competent child to a position where she can exercise
the rights of a data subject herself.32 Might this be complemented by a duty towards
the emerging competent child that can be discharged by the data controller or public
authority? There are a number of ways that such a duty might be met. For example,
might a controller provide parents with a form (or online contact details, etc.) to give
to the child when the parents have reason to believe the child understands? Might a
public body, such as the relevant data protection Supervisory Authority or a health
research regulatory authority, create a central register of participation in research, so
the mature or maturing minor knows where to go to ﬁnd out the projects in which
she is involved? Answering these questions sits outside the frame of this article but,
we suggest, they are important for data controllers and regulators to consider. As we
argue below, it is likely to be in the data controllers’ own interests to ensure that a
child is effectively engaged in decisions relating to the processing of her data as early
as possible.
1. Children in Scotland
The Data Protection Bill 2017 makes special provision for children in Scotland.
Clause 187 provides that where ‘a question falls to be determined in Scotland as to
the legal capacity of a person aged under 16 to
a. exercise a right conferred by the data protection legislation, or
b. give consent for the purposes of the data protection legislation,’33
then, the ‘person is to be taken to have that capacity where the person has a
general understanding of what it means to exercise the right or give such consent’.34 A
person ‘. . . aged 12 or over is to be presumed to be of sufﬁcient age and maturity to
have such understanding, unless the contrary is shown’.35
31 ibid 6.
32 See parallel discussion of responsibilities of parents, ibid para 4.10.
33 s 187(1)
34 s 187(2)
35 s 187(3). Note that this reﬂects existing provisions relating to Scotland. For example, as stated by the ICO:
‘[i]n Scotland, the law presumes that a child aged 12 years or more has the capacity to make a subject access re-
quest.’ See ICO, ‘Guide to Data Protection’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/
principle-6-rights/subject-access-request/> accessed 10 October 2017. See also Freedom of Information
(Scotland) Act 2002, s 69(2). Note also positions being taken, eg Aberdeen City Council’s Corporate Data
Protection Procedures for Third Party Request Procedures for Parents: ‘Once a child reaches the age of 12 years
they are deemed to be capable of making their own decisions with regards to their personal data.’ (para 3.1)
<http://www.aberdeencity.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.asp?lID¼59680&sID¼24439> accessed 10
October 2017.
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The implication of our argument thus far is that there will be little variation in
practice between Scotland, England, and Wales. One potential variation that does
warrant consideration is the difference between ‘full understanding’ and ‘general
understanding’. In the context of healthcare, in relation to Gillick competence, the
courts have stated
. . .what is involved is not merely an ability to understand the nature of the pro-
posed treatment - in this case compulsory medication - but a full understanding
and appreciation of the consequences both of the treatment in terms of
intended and possible side effects and, equally important, the anticipated
consequences of a failure to treat.36
A ‘full understanding’ would seem to clearly exceed the ‘general understanding’
required of Scottish children. We would suggest that the context of data protection be
relied upon to distinguish the approach taken by English courts in an application of
the Gillick test in the healthcare context. It would seem most appropriate to expect,
and to support, a ‘general understanding’ in relation to children on either side of the
border.
D. The Lawfulness of Continued Data Processing When a Child under Age 16
Attains Gillick Competence, and the Role of Best Interests
Underlying this discussion is the key issue of whether it is lawful for data processing
to continue when a child under the age of 16 attains Gillick competence in relation to
a decision, when consent was originally provided by a parent. Let us recall that the
draft ICO guidance states that parental consent ‘will always expire when the child
reaches the age at which they can consent for themselves’. If a child is able—in princi-
ple, but not necessarily in practice—to provide independent consent when Gillick
competent, then does this draft guidance imply that any consent provided previously
by a parent automatically expires? If so, this would present considerable practical
and ethical difﬁculties. Practically speaking, a data controller may have no means of
determining when an individual achieves competence beyond the initial contact with
the parent and child and parental consent. This difﬁculty is compounded when one
recognises that a ﬁnding of Gillick competence relates only to a particular decision.
Ethically speaking, even if assessed in relation to a speciﬁc decision, eg on participa-
tion, then unless welfare considerations are brought into play, an assessment of
competence could result in data processing stopping immediately even though it
could be in the best interest of a child for it to continue (eg enrolment in a long-term
paediatric clinical trial). This might undermine the medical purposes of processing
and may not be desirable from the perspective of the controller (eg a research institu-
tion) or, more importantly, the data subject.
As we have seen, best interest is a crucial consideration when parental consent
might expire—along with data processing. We have noted that Guidance from the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party recognises the best interests of the child to
36 Re R (n 8) (Lord Donaldson).
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be the ‘core legal principle’.37 This suggests that provided processing is in the best
interest of a child, then a previously provided parental consent should continue to be
understood to be a lawful basis for processing, even though a child might have attained
Gillick competence at a point thereafter for a (narrow) decision on that processing.
Moreover, we note that the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Children
views best interests as a threefold concept involving (i) a substantive right, (ii) funda-
mental interpretative legal principle, and (iii) a rule of procedure. While it is ‘com-
plex’, ‘ﬂexible’, and ‘adaptable’, it is always the primary consideration.38 Thus, we
would argue that where Gillick competence is the relevant test for determining
whether a minor may exercise data subject rights, this entails that proxy consent by
the parent will remain a valid option and continuing legal basis if the processing is in
the child’s best interest. It is important to recall that as a general principle of law, par-
ents can only lawfully exercise their rights and responsibilities within the parameters of
their children’s welfare.39 Therefore, it may be assumed by a data controller to be a
rebuttable presumption that to continue processing on the basis of an enduring
parental consent will be in the best interests of the child.
This is the case even where a controller suspects that an individual is perhaps likely
now to meet the test of Gillick competence, eg they have reached 14 or 15 years of
age, if timely re-contact for the purposes of seeking fresh explicit consent from the
mature minor is not practicable. There is an argument that it would not be in the data
subject’s own best interest for processing to stop until or unless that further express
consent can be obtained. Here it may be signiﬁcant that the example given by the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party in its Opinion does not suggest that
consent must be obtained. They state instead that ‘it seems that the data subject need
give explicit consent wherever this is required’ (emphasis added).40 In the example
given by the Working Party, the data controller is required to consider, when a legal
representative has given explicit consent to the inclusion of his child (the data
subject), whether ‘he still has a valid basis’ to process sensitive personal data upon the
child attaining capacity.
In terms of a data controller’s responsibilities, at least three issues arise from this.
First, does the data controller have reason to believe he does not have an enduring
consent from the parents that provides a lawful basis for on-going processing?
Secondly, does the data controller have any reason to believe that the continuing pro-
cessing of the data would not be in the best interests of the child? Thirdly, does the
data controller have a practicable opportunity to seek consent directly from a child
where they have reason to believe that the child has achieved sufﬁcient maturity to
make a decision for herself (for example, communication from the child directly in
37 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 20).
38 See United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Children, General Comment No 14 (2013) on the
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (2013) <http://www2.
ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_GC_14_ENG.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017.
39 Although, as indicated in the Children Act 1989, the parents have rights and duties different from, for exam-
ple, a court. Parents have a duty of care to their child, but it is arguably in balance with other rights and
duties in the family. Equally, they have rights to raise their child according to their sensitivities where they
are not in (danger of) breach of that general duty of care.
40 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 20) 5.
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relation to the processing operation)? If the answer to each of these questions is ‘no’,
then it would appear appropriate to recognise the parental consent to continue to
provide a lawful basis for processing irrespective of whether, in fact, the child has
attained a level of maturity that would satisfy the test of Gillick competence in relation
to the processing.
I I I . A BRIGHT LINE AT AGE 16 OR 18 IN DATA PROTECTION LAW?
Gillick competence applies to children under age 16 but, as we have seen, in English
and Welsh law, persons over age 16 but still under 18 have a statutory entitlement to
consent to their own medical treatment.41 This raises further concerns for the data
controller. In particular, how does this translate to the data protection context and
using data for health research purposes? Is 16 the age at which a controller must seek
consent from an individual under data protection law, or is it 18? As we have seen,
the Data Protection Bill 2017 makes speciﬁc mention of the age of 16 in relation to
children in Scotland, but beyond this it offers little in the way of clarity. The only
other reference to children’s age is in relation to ‘information society services’. Here,
the processing of personal data can only be lawful where consent has been provided
by somebody over the age of 13. This does not apply to preventive or counselling
services,42 and ‘information society services’ will typically fall outside the scope of
healthcare or health-related research.
Despite legislation providing little clarity here,43 particularly in the context of pro-
cessing data for medical purposes, it would be incongruous for an individual to be
able to consent to care and treatment but not to the associated data processing.
Furthermore, if a 16-year-old can consent to data processing in the context of health-
care, then why not other contexts such as health research? We argue that, particularly
in light of reference to 16 years in the GDPR, and further to the caveats that we
express above about the medico-legal case law dealing with the period of 16–18, there
is reason to presume sufﬁcient maturity to exercise all the rights of a data subject at
age 16. Given this, a respect for data autonomy would suggest a responsibility on data
controllers to seek an individual’s own consent when they reach age 16, including
where the controller was previously reliant upon previous parental consent as the legal
basis for data processing.
Although the best interest test remains relevant from age 16, as in relation to
Gillick competence, it will be increasingly difﬁcult to argue effectively that it is in an
individual’s best interest for processing to continue if she expressly dissents. However,
if a controller has no evidence to rebut the presumption that processing that began
with a parental consent is in her best interests—and can otherwise be demonstrated
to be ‘fair’ (as we discuss below)—then processing should continue after age 16 at
least while efforts are made to seek her views. This position, we admit, is in opposition
41 s 8, Family Law Reform Act 1969.
42 Clause 8, Data Protection Bill 2017.
43 At least not within UK data protection law or the GDPR outside the context of information society services.
For discussion of consent in the context of information society services and where domestic legislation does
establish a ‘bright-line’ in some EU Member States, see M Macenaite and E Kosta, ‘Consent for Processing
Children’s Personal Data in the EU: Following in US Footsteps?’ (2017) 26 Inf Commun Technol L 146,
esp 153, 189.
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to the view expressed by the ICO in its draft guidance if they intended to imply 16 is
the age at which a child can consent for herself. However, we suggest that the ICO
guidance fails to capture sufﬁciently the transitory nature of a child’s growing maturity,
which is precisely what Gillick competence attempts to do earlier in the process,44 and
the continued application of best interests as an overriding consideration until the age
of 18. Accordingly, we argue that the validity of a parental consent may still endure,
but the conditions become more challenging for a data controller to meet.
The fairness of processing, while a relevant consideration to any data processing,45
may be considered to have special signiﬁcance in circumstances where an individual
independently competent to exercise a right to consent has not done so, and yet con-
sent is relied upon as the basis for processing. Data protection law establishes a num-
ber of conditions for fair processing, including the provision of certain information
relating to data processing to the data subject.46 We suggest that, as a minimum, to
meet the requirements of fair processing, there must be at least joint communication
to the child herself, as well as her parents, of the identity of the data controller and
the purposes of processing (and under the GDPR a number of additional details47).
It would need to be openly and transparently communicated to both the parents
originally providing consent and the data subject the accessible means by which she
can exercise her rights as a data subject. Arguably, relevant to the fairness of continued
processing is also the extent to which the child was originally involved in the original
decision to provide consent, and whether she assented to the processing.
We suggest that from the point that an individual might independently provide a
valid consent, there should be particular efforts to provide relevant information
directly to her and to establish her own view. To continue to process ignorant of her
view risks her subsequently disputing any claim that processing was, in fact, in
her best interests. The three conditions that need to be met, therefore, are:
1. existing parental consent extends to the ongoing processing;
2. the data controller has no reason to doubt that the processing on the basis of a
parental consent will be in the best interests of a minor—at 16 or 17 years old
(relevant to this last point will be any indication that the data subject dissents);
and, as soon as one knows, or should presume, a child has capacity to consent
on her own behalf, that
3. the continued processing on the basis of parental consent is fair.
This suggests that age 16 should not be considered to be a bright line at which a
parental consent becomes invalid, nor a point at which a child’s consent must neces-
sarily be secured. The fact that a data controller should assume that a child has sufﬁ-
cient maturity to make a decision for herself at that age only implies responsibilities to
engage from that point directly with the data subject rather than her parents. In case
44 We discuss this further in G Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation: What
are We Missing in the Spaces In-between?’ (2017) 25 Med L Rev 47.
45 The ﬁrst data protection principle is that processing be both fair and lawful. See pt I, sch 1, Data Protection
Act 1998. This principle is retained as art 5(1) GDPR.
46 See pt II, sch 1, Data Protection Act 1998.
47 Set out in art 13 GDPR.
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of receiving conﬂicting requests from the data subject and her parents, the data
controller should record reasons for resolving that conﬂict in the child’s best interests.
To summarise our argument so far, if a data controller comes to know, or has
reason to know, that a child under 16 years of age is Gillick competent, then it should
make reasonable efforts to ascertain the child’s view and to accommodate them,
including respecting the child’s own consent. The paramount responsibility is,
however, to act in the best interest of child and, therefore, to continue to process data
consistent with the previous parental consent while the child’s consent is sought
(assuming the processing is demonstrated to continue to be in the child’s best inter-
est). If a child dissents to data processing, then the best interests’ judgement must be
made taking that dissent into account. As a child approaches the age of full majority,
and passes the age (16) at which competence may be presumed, it will be increasingly
difﬁcult to argue that she cannot determine for herself what is in her best interests
and that processing is ‘fair’ if information about that processing has not been provided
directly to her and her view sought. Arguably, it is more difﬁcult to establish an
overriding dissent to be in a child’s best interests in the context of data processing
than in the context of life-saving treatment. Current guidance fails to reﬂect the
nuance of these processes or the possible dilemmas that can arise.
IV . FAIR AND LAWFUL PROCESSING UPON MATURITY
At the far end of the spectrum of maturity, the ICO draft guidance states that parental
consent ceases to provide a valid legal basis for processing beyond the child’s attain-
ment of legal adulthood, and in cases where the now-adult has not provided her own
consent, then a legal basis other than consent would need to be established. If this is
the case, then this possibility is avoided by effective engagement with the data subject
prior to the age of 18. Through that contact there will have been opportunity to
establish the data subject’s consent to the processing.
The fairness of continuing to process data without a valid consent, by relying upon
an alternative legal basis will, at that point, be strictly scrutinised. Regulators have
indicated that one must ensure it is ‘fair’ to switch from consent as the legal basis of
processing to an alternative.48 Failure to do so may provide a data subject with an
inaccurate impression of the extent to which she may exercise control, and the means
by which she might exercise that control, over processing.
Therefore, if a data controller wishes to argue that it would be fair to continue to
process a child’s data even after she has reached legal adulthood, then the controller
would be well advised to make reasonable efforts to contact the child prior to them
becoming an adult, informing them of the processing and the individual’s rights as a
data subject, and provide detailed opportunities for how to consent to ongoing
processing. If an alternative legal basis is available, besides consent, then the data
controller should notify persons of that intention and provide clear and accessible
means by which either consent may be withdrawn prior to that point or objection
raised after it. Depending on the nature of the data processing operation, notice via
email, letter in the post, or website notice may sufﬁce; our questions raised at the end
48 See ICO, GDPR Consent Guidance (n 2) 8.
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of Section II.C in this article, about, for example, the need for registration of research,
apply here also.
V. FAIR AND LAWFUL PROCESSING IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA
These considerations must also be set against ever-changing technical capabilities with
regard to the processing of personal data. The era of Big Data is already upon us, and
an early casualty will be the stubborn persistence of artiﬁcial categories—often created
by law—between personal data and anonymised data, health and non-health data, re-
search and audit, and other silos that have so far bounded much of the thinking and
practice in the ﬁeld of data protection. A 2017 discussion paper from the ICO reveals
the extent of the challenges.49 The paper is an update of a 2014 document addressing
the same topic, but possibilities and practices have moved on considerably in three
years. For the ICO, these represent an opportunity to examine how Big Data and data
protection can work together.
In this section, we brieﬂy examine some of the emerging issues and instances of
best practices as these might impact on children and young people. We suggest that it
is particularly important to do so because this group of citizens is at the forefront of
user uptake when it comes to emerging technological developments, yet their own
emerging autonomy and legal rights are often overlooked in the discussions. As we
have seen, the Data Protection Bill 2017 signals the intent to take advantage of the
opportunity inherent within the GDPR to reduce the age of consent for information
society services to age 13 in the UK. It is important that any apparent ‘bright line’
difference between the age of maturity for consent to use of data for medical purposes
and consent to information society services is signiﬁcantly obscured where individuals
satisfy the Gillick test if that is to be a test of general application in the data protection
context. In any case, the opportunities that the ICO encourage data controllers to
take in the context of Big Data are directly relevant to the kinds of engagement we
have described above. Our intention here, however, is not simply to bolster our claims
regarding good practice in a cognate ﬁeld. The reality is that guidance regarding
communication and consent in the context of Big Data will be increasingly of direct
signiﬁcance to processing for healthcare and health research purposes.
In its 2017 paper, the ICO suggest that ‘big data analytics’ involving the linkage
and sharing of potentially vast volumes of data across diverse sectors and heteroge-
neous settings represents a step-change in data processing and its regulation. Offering
the example of education, the paper states:
Learning analytics in higher education (HE) involves the combination of ‘static
data’ such as traditional student records with ‘ﬂuid data’ such as swipe card data
from entering campus buildings, using virtual learning environments (VLEs)
and downloading e-resources. The analysis of this information can reveal trends
that help to improve HE processes, beneﬁting both staff and students.50
49 Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, ‘Big Data, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data
Protection’ (June 2017)<https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-
and-data-protection.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017.
50 ibid para 27.
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When one adds to this the temporal consideration of access to earlier stage education
records, the potential beneﬁts (and risks) are further multiplied. Linking to health re-
cords might, in turn, help to reveal correlations between childhood ill health and aca-
demic performance, and all of this processing might improve future decision-making
for individuals and social institutions alike. But, what of the lawfulness and legitimacy
of such practices?
The ICO sees no reason why the watchwords of accountability and transparency
should not drive best practice. Moreover, in legal terms, the enduring role of consent,
privacy notices, privacy impact assessments, and data subject rights remain (rightly)
front and centre. Of direct relevance to this article are discussions of the role of social
media, and the impact of citizens’ behaviours on their expectations of privacy and the
role of consent. As is self-evident, young people will often develop an early presence
on social media—a ripe source of potentially valuable data for any Big Data initiative.
And yet, as various surveys have pointed out, this setting can give rise to a ‘privacy
paradox’:
. . . people may express concerns about the impact on their privacy of ‘creepy’
uses of their data, but in practice they contribute their data anyway via the online
systems they use. In other words they provide the data because it is the price of
using internet services.51
In response, the ICO points to examples of ‘graduated consent’ that is based on an
ongoing relationship with a service provider, and ‘just in time’ notiﬁcations that seek
citizen authorisation before a new instance of data processing takes place. Such techni-
cal measures, we contend, could also be designed-in to the regulation of relationships
with children of growing maturity, perhaps having a default time trigger at the age of
16 and again at full legal capacity, but also by seeking evidence — perhaps through
the medium of Big Data — of the individual child’s own developing autonomy and
maturity through her online presence.52
In like manner, the ICO argues persuasively for imaginative uses of privacy notices
that can cut through and minimise the perceived complexity of explaining Big Data,
perhaps through the use of videos and cartoons, as used by enterprises such as O2
and The Guardian.53 Finally, the ICO points to the important potential role of ethical
approaches to data processing in this emerging era. For example, the Information
51 ibid para 44, citing J Pybus, M Cote´ and T Blanke, ‘Hacking the Social Life of Big Data’ (2015) 2(2) Big
Data Soc 1; SE Peacock, ‘How Web Tracking Changes User Agency in the Age of Big Data: The Used
User’ (2014) 1(2) Big Data Soc 1.
52 The ICO adds the important caveat that ‘. . . [j]ust because people have put data onto social media without
restricting access does not necessarily legitimise all further use of it.’ ibid para 64. These measures would
have to be designed in such a way as to conform to the requirements of the GDPR. Recital 38 recognises
that children merit special protection with regard to their personal data, in particular, eg where collecting
personal data with regards to children when using services offered directly to a child. Recital 71 makes clear
that children should not be the subjects of proﬁling solely on the grounds of automated processing, where
there are legal or similarly signiﬁcant effects. Any evidence gathered on capacity, via Big Data, might
(at most) trigger human review before affecting a data controller’s understanding of a child’s capacity to
consent on her own behalf.
53 ibid para 145.
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Accountability Foundation has its Big Data Ethics Initiative from which a series of
ethical values have been proposed for assessing big data initiatives.54 These include:
• organisations should deﬁne the beneﬁts of the analytics;
• they should not incur the risks of big data analytics if the beneﬁts could be achieved
by less risky means;
• the insights should be sustainable;
• the processing should respect the interests of stakeholders; and
• the outcomes of the processing should be fair to individuals and avoid discriminatory
impacts.
Albeit developed at a high level of abstraction, similar values and proposals could
be developed for initiatives that will involve children and young people, and that
would include the kinds of perspectives for which we argue in this article. Thus, for ex-
ample, we might include the following additional considerations:
• the beneﬁts of the analytics must be defensible in the best interests of the children
concerned;
• the design of the analytics should take account of the growing autonomy of the child,
especially where the processing is on the basis of parental consent; and
• the lawful and ethical basis for the analytics should be reviewed upon maturity of the
child, with clear lines of accountability and transparency.
In sum, we suggest that the era of Big Data holds considerable beneﬁcial potential
but that it also stands to impact disproportionately on younger citizens if the key
messages of this article are not heeded.
VI . ALTERNATIVES TO CONSENT AS LEGAL BASIS FOR PROCESSING
We ﬁnish by brieﬂy reﬂecting on the signiﬁcance of a recent move to highlight the
availability of alternatives to consent as a legal basis for processing personal data. In
order to be lawful under the GDPR, the processing of personal data must meet at least
one of the conditions set out in Article 6(1) GDPR. Consent is but one of the avail-
able conditions for lawful processing. If processing a special category of personal data,
such as data concerning an individual’s health, then it is also necessary to apply one of
the conditions set out in Article 9(2) GDPR. ‘Explicit consent’ is an option here, but
again only one of several alternatives.
In the draft guidance issued by the ICO on consent under the GDPR, the ICO
make clear their view that the ‘GDPR sets a high standard for consent’55 and conﬁrm
that ‘[c]onsent is one lawful basis for processing, but there are alternatives.’56 In fact,
they expressly guide controllers away from a reliance upon consent where they are
public authorities: ‘Public authorities, employers and other organisations in a position
54 Information Accountability Foundation, ‘Big Data Ethics Initiative’ <http://informationaccountability.org/
big-data-ethics-initiative/> accessed 10 October 2017.
55 ICO, GDPR Consent Guidance (n 2) 5.
56 ibid 11.
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of power over individuals should avoid relying upon consent’57—and the Data
Protection Bill 2017 indicates that universities will be public authorities for the pur-
poses of data protection law.58 Where there are appropriate alternatives to consent,
then UK universities, responsible for much of the health research and the longitudinal
studies we have as our focal point, are receiving a clear steer towards them and away
from consent (for data protection purposes).59
What does this mean for the argument we have advanced? We have already consid-
ered the situation where processing starts on the basis of parental consent and then a
controller considers shifting to another legal basis. What, though, if consent is not the
legal basis from the outset? While the arguments in this article have application to
many longitudinal studies already started, is signiﬁcance of consent likely to wane as
controllers shift to alternative legal bases in the future? Possibly. But we would offer
two brief reﬂections. The ﬁrst is that the relevance of the arguments put forward here
remains undented for those projects that have already started on the basis of (a paren-
tal) consent. They are important projects and deserve clarity regarding a route
through to lawful processing as participants mature. The second is that, while a move
from consent as the legal basis for health research may occur, this is because there are
alternatives to consent for health research under data protection law60 that are not al-
ways going to be available where data is processed for other (non-research) purposes.
Here, we repeat a point made at the outset, although the arguments offered here are
prompted by a concern for the ongoing legal basis for health research; as the argu-
ments apply to the processing of children’s personal data more generally, they have a
potentially broader application.
VII . CONCLUSION
In this article, we explored the topical question of whether consent obtained from a
parent for use of a child’s personal data for health research ‘lapses’ when the child is
old enough to provide her own consent, and if so, when that lapse might occur, and
how is it to be determined. We considered, and challenged, the suggestion in draft
guidance by the ICO that parental consent will always expire when the child reaches
the age at which they can consent for themselves. We argued that if the processing of
a child’s data began with the consent of their parent, then there is a need to ﬁnd and
defend an enduring consent through the child’s growing capacity and certainly on to
their maturity. The Gillick test can assist in determining when the shift in focus might
occur from parent to child, but this does not determine any clear bright line, and it
envisions a continuing role for best interest considerations. As such, it is not at all
57 ibid.
58 Clause 6, Data Protection Bill 2017.
59 See E Denham, ‘Consent is Not the ‘Silver Bullet’ for GDPR Compliance’ ICO Blog (16 August 2017)
<https://iconewsblog.org.uk/2017/08/16/consent-is-not-the-silver-bullet-for-gdpr-compliance/> accessed 10
October 2017. It is worth recognising that consent will continue to be an important means by which confor-
mity with other legal requirements—such as those associated with the common law duty of conﬁdence—are
met.
60 Universities are likely to be able to rely upon art 6(1)(e) GDPR where processing personal data for the pur-
poses of research and art 9(2)(j) where processing a special category of personal data (including data con-
cerning health) for research purposes, as long as the relevant conditions are met.
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clear that the Gillick threshold presents an absolute legal requirement for a child’s con-
sent in order for processing to be lawful, let alone a preferred ethical approach. The
Gillick test assesses a narrow decision-speciﬁc competence. In the healthcare context,
the pre-16 child’s competence to make a consent decision under the Gillick test exists
in parallel with duties of others to act as proxy for them (with his or her best interests
as an overriding consideration).
Given that best interests remain an overriding consideration until age 18, and also
in the data protection context, we suggested that it is ethically preferable and legally
defensible for data controllers to envision or ascertain the emerging ability of an indi-
vidual to exercise the rights of a data subject ﬁrst jointly (rather than in parallel) with a
parent and then independently of them (rather than solely). The ability of a child to
provide an independent consent does not proscribe her parents continuing to exercise
a parallel duty to provide a consent where consistent with her best interests. Similarly,
there is no reason to suppose a previously provided consent lapses simply due to a
child achieving Gillick competence in relation to a speciﬁc decision. Indeed, the practi-
cal implications of such a position would likely overwhelm data controllers and
discourage the processing of children where there was any possibility they may be
competent in relation to a decision on processing. This too would not be in the child’s
best interests.
A straightforward transplant of the Gillick test from the healthcare context to the
realm of data protection is problematic for other reasons. The ﬁrst is the requirement
for ‘full understanding’ that the courts have insisted upon within the healthcare con-
text. In Scotland, in the data protection domain, children are to be required to have
only a ‘general understanding’ before they may exercise certain rights of a data subject.
We have suggested that this threshold also be relied upon for data protection that
applies on both sides of the border. Further, Gillick competence has relevance in the
healthcare context up to the age of 16 (and not the age of full majority). While neither
regulatory guidance nor the data protection legislation makes clear that legal compe-
tence to exercise the rights of a data subject should be presumed at the age of 16
(in England and Wales, consistent with the FLRA), we argue that the presumption
should apply in the area of data protection, including in relation to health research.
As a result, the conditions upon which a controller may rely upon a previous parental
consent become more challenging. There may be limited circumstances in which a
data controller considers it appropriate to continue to process data relating to a child
past the age of 16, and on the basis of a parental consent. These circumstances would
most likely be limited to those where the following considerations apply:
1. the requirements regarding consent were met at the time that consent was origi-
nally given;
2. there is no reason to rebut the presumption that, in line with previous parental
consent, it remains in the best interest of the child that the processing continue;
and
3. it would be ‘fair’ to rely upon the alternative legal basis in the circumstances.
Whether it would be ‘fair’ requires consideration of all material factors including,
but not limited to,
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1. whether it is clear to the data subject, ie the child, that she has rights in relation
to the processing, including the right to object;
2. the extent to which the child was originally involved in the original decision to
provide consent, and whether she assented to the processing;
3. the extent to which considerations of ‘best interest’ are engaged and favour pro-
cessing; and
4. evidence from any context in which the child has begun to exercise her own
data autonomy, for example, through social media or other means that suggest
evidence of growing maturity.
If a child has been engaged appropriately with the initial decision by a parent to
provide consent to processing, and subsequent communication materials have been
addressed to her as well as the parent and have extended to re-enforcing the right to
withdraw consent at any point, then there is at least an arguable case that a consent
previously provided by a parent does not cease to provide a secure lawful basis for
processing as soon as a child is old enough to provide her own consent: either as
soon as she attained a particular age short of full maturity (eg 16 years), or if she could
satisfy a test of Gillick competence in relation to the particular decision. Where they
had been previously engaged as joint decision makers in giving the consent, it is
reasonable to continue to presume the processing to be in her best interests. The con-
tinued processing may remain lawful at least while efforts to re-engage with the data
subject and to seek fresh consent were made. Data controllers would be wise to
develop strategies for when and how to seek fresh consent from children as soon as is
practicable after the data controller has reason to be aware they are mature enough to
consent on their own behalf.
We acknowledge that as one moves away from a hypothetical ideal involving full
engagement and agreement between parties, it becomes more challenging to argue for
fair and lawful to continue to process data for medical purposes, when original con-
sent was provided by a parent and when this remains the sole basis for data process-
ing. This is particularly challenging in the face of a refusal by a mature minor or
someone between age 16 and 18. Post-18, where controllers have not successfully ob-
tained consent from the child previously, then they should only normally continue to
process where an alternative legal basis is available to them. Here, processing must still
be fair. When assessing whether continued processing is ‘fair’, there should be an
additional consideration to those listed above: whether reliance upon that alternative
legal basis as a ground for processing has been openly and transparently communi-
cated to both the parent (or other legal representative) originally providing consent
and also the data subject.
In order to avoid the possibility that data controllers ﬁnd themselves without a
legal basis for the processing of an individual’s data after age 18 (or earlier), they
would be well advised to adopt some of the techniques for effective communication
now being developed in the context of Big Data. As Big Data requires a response to
the challenge of relative opaque processing and dynamic purposes, so might those re-
sponses serve to engage effectively an audience that is itself dynamic and developing.
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The ultimate lesson here is for both productive engagement with children and to view
consent as a process, just as childhood is a process towards maturity itself.
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